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Vehicles, machines that helped people to succeed in throwing of the shackles of human- or animal-powered 
transportation, have long been developing but stayed fundamentally the same. Save for technological 
innovations, vehicles have remained dependent on humans. New, conceptually different vehicles have 
started cropping up because of their Artificial Intelligent (A.I.) systems. These systems enable autonomous 
operating vehicles. What is peculiar to the autonomous vehicles is that they will no longer be depended on 
human control but operate at the same level as humans. In the light of that, judges are about to face emerging 
problems connected with adapting legislation to the technology development. The notion ‘adapting’ should 
be stressed here due to the fact that creating the convention which will always comply with the technology 
development is almost impossible. At the level of international conventions the framework for their 
interpretation based on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) allows for stretching the 
currently existing concepts and adapting them among the others to technological change. This, however, 
has some boundaries because the interpretation needs always to be imbedded in parties’ will. The judges 
will also need to consider the evolving initiatives concerning autonomous vehicles, because these might 
collide with mandatory international conventions. The aim of this article is to analyze whether the CMR is 
future-proof for autonomous transportation. The functional aspects of dealing with autonomous vehicles 
are compiled with the instruments for the treaty interpretation to investigate what the consequences of 
adapting the concept of vehicle are. Within the CMR convention, the use of autonomous vehicles seems to 
stretch the current concepts and framework to its limits, giving rise to the question when the moment comes 
when stretching the framework leads to breaking the framework of the CMR convention.  
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Autonomous technology, including autonomous vehicles, is a perfect example of the step from dumb to 
smart technology. Future technological systems that are autonomous are not restricted to assisting humans, 
but are able to operate on the same level as humans. Autonomous vehicles use machine learning to operate 
without human control and are getting ready to arrive on the market in a few years. 
Many steps have been taken to achieve the technological progress connected with vehicles’ autonomy the 
society is facing now. From the industrial revolution onwards, technology evolved from rudimentary tools 
to complex technological systems that have been implemented on a large scale. These were until recently 
– in essence – dumb technological systems, merely complex tools that assisted and were controlled and 
coded by humans. The introduction of a personal computer and computational applications in commerce, 
government and everyday life in the second part of the twentieth century – with for example the Apple II 
and the IBM PC – started an era in which new technological possibilities were explored and the first steps 
to more intelligent technology have been set. The concept of Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) allowing the 
machines to operate autonomous in the future has been present during the development of computer 
technology, but proofed hard to develop and to implement in the 1960’s and 1970’s, resulting in a fading 
interest in A.I. and the so-called A.I. winter in the 1980’s. Breakthrough developments at the start of the 
twenty-first century rekindled the interest in A.I., re-established it’s funding, and since then progress has 
been made at an astonishing pace. The historical promise of A.I. – the rise of intelligent machines – not 
only seems to be plausible, but is actually happening. 
These technological advances has also influenced the nature of transportation in Europe and globally. 
Automation by computer technology is deeply integrated into all aspects of the transportation process. 
Physical transportation of goods is one of these developments that is already being tested with autonomous 
technology.1 Autonomous vehicles are not part of science fiction any more but are already present on the 
road. Small-scale transportation of goods with autonomous vehicles is being tested by companies like 
Alphabet and Amazon. Recently, ride-sharing company Uber acquired the self-driving truck start-up Otto 
to develop self-driving trucks2 whereas Tesla announced their plans to develop an electric truck which will 
have their market-leading Autopilot software.3 These experiments can give valuable data on the potential 
benefits and problems with these types of autonomous transportation, data that can be used to develop or 
future-proof applicable regulation. 
In the light of these developments, the question if the CMR convention is a future-proof for autonomous 
transportation is therefore an interesting one. In the field of transport law A.I. was so far discussed in the 
context of unmanned shipping under maritime law4 and some attempts were made to suggest the strict 
liability of the manufactures of autonomous vehicles in the context of passenger transportation.5 Here we 
focus whether the CMR is still adequate to cover cases where the autonomous vehicle plays a prominent 
role. In order to answer it, we focus firstly on interpretative tools that give an option to stretch the concepts 
existing in the conventions (Section 2). In turn we look at the autonomous vehicles in a functional way. 
Meaning, we elaborate on how sector deals with their autonomous character; who and what can functionally 
be considered as a driver or vehicle (Section 3). The outcomes of section 2 and 3 serve then as a base to 
                                                            
1 Hengstler, Monika, Ellen Enkel, and Selina Duelli, 'Applied artificial intelligence and trust—The case of autonomous 
vehicles and medical assistance devices' [2016] 105 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 105-120.  
2 See: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-volvo-otto-idUSKCN10T1TR> 
3 See: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-21/tesla-s-musk-calls-for-building-semi-truck-in-new-
master-plan> 
4 Eric van Hooydonk, 'The law of unmanned merchant shipping – an exploration' [2014] 20(6) The Journal of 
International Maritime Law  403-424. 
5 Dylan LeValley, 'Autonomous Vehicle Liability – Application of Common Carrier Liability' [2013] 36(5) Seattle 





analyse the autonomous transportation in the context of CMR (Section 4). The last section concludes 
(Section 5).   
2. Technology development and evolution of the CMR – is there a chance for compatibility? 
The purpose of this section is to present the interpretative framework of the CMR with the special focus on 
evolutionary terms. In other words, we look for ways of achieving compatibility between changing concepts 
and the already existing regulation (2.2.) in the framework for the CMR interpretation (2.1). Our approach 
implies certain assumptions. First of all, creating a regulation which will always comply with the 
progressing development of technology is rather impossible due to a long process of drafting and 
implementing especially at the international level. For the international road transportation the CMR will 
therefore remain the basic legal tool. Secondly, international conventions are in principle of rather general 
nature. As a result, the judge adjudicating on the base of the CMR will have to interpret the text in the light 
of changing circumstances including technology development. Finally, a new regulatory framework might 
even not be necessary as a result of the fact that transport conventions are more often perceived as one field 
in looking for solutions to unresolved legal issues. This is not only because the transport conventions simply 
transplanted some solutions from their predecessors or ‘neighbours’ regulating a different transport mode6 
but also due to the fact that national judges tend to pay attention to one another's case law in order to have 
some guidelines while deciding their cases.7  
2.1. General framework for interpretation 
The starting point on the interpretation of the CMR is its art. 47 conferring jurisdiction on the International Court of 
Justice as far as cases related to the interpretation or application of this Convention are concerned. The 
jurisdiction is not exclusive though. The Parties are not obliged to submit the case to the Court; instead they 
may do so if they are unable to settle by negotiation or by other means. Due to that the burden of 
interpretation and application of the CMR rests primarily on national courts. These in turn should interpret 
treaties (that is also international conventions) according to the framework of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Concluded in 1969 and entered into force in 1980 – thus after CMR – causes a problem 
with its applicability to the treaties existing beforehand. However, since the articles 31-338 VCLT – which 
are setting the interpretative framework – are regarded already as customary law9. Furthermore, these 
articles in principle conform to the practice of interpretation existing before the Law of Treaties, meaning 
the reliance on good faith and common intentions of the parties10, they will be the ground for the following 
considerations.  
The framework of arts 31-33 VCLT provides to the judge instruments for interpreting international 
conventions. It assures the convention’s autonomous standing, which is staying away from the national law 
in order to support the idea of unified law.11 This is supported by increasing reliance on the comparative 
method where the courts instead of turning to national law do take the foreign judgements into 
                                                            
6 More on the ‘legal transplants’ see: Jörg Fedtke, ‘Legal transplants’ Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, (Edward 
Elgar 2012) 550-553. 
7 Malcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (Informa 2009) 10-11. 
8 The framework includes also art. 33 VCLT which is not considered in deep in current submission. 
9 Panos Merkouris, (Inter)Temporal Considerations in the Interpretative Process of the VCLT: Do Treaties Endure, 
Perdure or Exdure? in Mónika Ambrus (eds), 45 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law ( 2014) 147-148 and 
case law cited there. 
10 Andrea Bianchi and others, Interpretation in International Law, (Oxford 2015) 194-201. 
11 See for example the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof from 14.02.2008 I ZR 183/05 as referred in [2008] 43(6) 
European Transport Law Journal where the court stated that the notion ‘contract of carriage’ should be understood 





consideration.12 The interpretation starts with the actual text of the convention and its natural meaning 
(compared also on the ground of other language versions of the convention) consistent with normal meaning 
and other parts or special meaning intended by the parties (i). While deciding the ordinary meaning the 
context should be taken in consideration which comprises possible modifying agreements and other 
connected instruments (ii). The same influence has also a subsequent agreement or practice in the 
application of the treaty (iii). All ambiguities in turn should be resolved in the light of the convention’s 
purpose (iv). Should the interpretation on the ground of the preceding points lead to conflicting results the 
courts can recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, e.g. travaux preparatories (v). Interpretation 
is correct if a legal decision is defensible and plausible. Plausibility is in turn supported if these decisions 
are predictable and acceptable – also with regard to passing over or stretching the ossified regulation – thus 
contributing to the legal certainty.13 Finally, acceptability should rest on protecting parties’ intentions, 
legitimate expectations and treaty’s object and purpose.14 
In order to apply all the steps correctly the court should balance different means and principles of 
interpretation. The grammatical arguments should be supported by systemic, teleological and historical 
arguments whereas the leading principle of actuality by principles of integration, effectiveness and 
subsequent practice.15 The principle of actuality relates to the interpretation on the basis of actual text and 
natural meanings of the words, thus grammatical arguments. Integration and effectiveness imply that the 
treaties should be interpreted as a whole with reference to their object and purpose and the terms should be 
given the fullest weight and effect consistent with normal meaning and other parts.16 They basically imply 
teleological arguments but under command because actuality is the prevailing one - thus preventing 
excessive judicial discretion. The subsequent practice is in principle the interpretation operating between 
the parties.  
Interpretation of the CMR constitutes thus a complex process, requiring many aspects to be taken into 
consideration. The convention, taken away from the national context, needs to be treated autonomously and 
there should be a constant balance between methods and principles of interpretation while taking the next 
steps of interpretation. As mentioned, interpretation is correct if a legal decision is defensible and plausible, 
that is predictable and acceptable. On the one hand, one may question predictability because there is no 
warranty of uniform application. Courts despite depending on the same framework may arrive with different 
conclusions. Nevertheless, the unified framework assures still higher certainty than adjudication on the base 
of different national jurisdictions. On the other hand, acceptability might be questioned as the call for 
balancing different methods and principles of interpretation is not founded on the strict rules. However, 
since the practice of interpretation is imbedded in good faith and common intentions of the parties, which 
in the case of the CMR can be broadly identified with the purpose of the convention, these will constitute 
a natural barrier for interpretations going beyond it.  
                                                            
12 See for example the judgement of the Hoge Raad Der Nederlanden from 18.12.2009 Nr. 07/11057 as referred in 
[2010] 45(1) European Transport Law Journal where the court confirmed the interpretation of art. 32 CMR according 
to standards set in art. 31 VCLT and underlined that the case law and jurisprudence from the Member States form a 
primary tool of interpretation because of falling under the art. 31(3) VCLT. 
13 See three elements of legal certainty as presented by Juha Raiti i.e. formal factual and substantive. Formal relates 
to predictability, substantive to acceptability whereas factual excludes obsoletes laws, in: Juha Raitio, The Priniple of 
Legal Certainty in EC Law, (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003) 372-375.  
14 Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, (Oxford Scholarship Online 2014) 74-75. 
15 G.G. Fitzmaurice, C.M.G., ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and 
Certain Other Points’ [1951] 28(1) British Year Book on International Law 7-24. 
16 Compare with: Juha Raitio, The Priniple of Legal Certainty in EC Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2003) p. 307; 
and Martin Gebauer, Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation”, [2000] 5 Uniform Law 





The purpose of the CMR is expressly stated in its preamble. The point is to standardize ‘the conditions 
governing the contract for the international carriage of goods by road, particularly with respect to the 
documents used for such carriage and to the carrier's liability’. The wording of preamble clarifies the 
meaning of the convention’s purpose and sets a standard of rather restrictive understanding of the 
convention.17 This is also confirmed by the art. 41 CMR where it is stated that any stipulation which would 
directly or indirectly derogate from the provisions of this convention shall be null and void. It implies that 
the terms used in the convention were intended to fix the scope of parties’ rights and obligations. This 
however does not preclude dynamic interpretation as far as technical terms are concerned. In another words 
parties’ intention leaves a room for the evolution of technical terms as far dynamic interpretation of these 
terms satisfies parties’ intention and the purpose of the convention.  
2.2. Evolutionary terms in the CMR interpretative framework  
According to the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law the concept can be considered 
evolutionary if it ‘(a) (…) is one which implies taking into account subsequent technical, economic or legal 
developments; (b) (…) sets up an obligation for further progressive development for the parties; or (c) (…) 
has a very general nature or is expressed in such general terms that it must take into account changing 
circumstances.’18 Thus, the presumption is that highly technical or general terms imply evolutionary 
character of concepts inherent in the conventions.19 The notion “evolutionary” should be stressed here as 
entirely new concepts will never be allowed to enter the already established sets of legal rules.20  
There are in principle two approaches to evolutionary terms in international law. The first one is grounded 
in the subsequent practice as expressed in art. 31(3)(b) VCLT. The second is based on the arts 31(1) and 
31(3)(c) VCLT. Here again the object and purpose of the convention are taken in consideration followed 
by applicability of relevant rules of international law. On the one hand these two approaches have different 
repercussions. Should the term be interpreted on the basis of subsequent practice, its new interpretation will 
remain fixed unless there is further subsequent practice. However, should there be signs in the text that the 
meaning of a term is dynamic, it will require interpretation on each occasion of the new case at hand.21 On 
the other hand, what these approaches have in common is that the recourse to them is still the subject to the 
intention of the parties.22  
The examples of evolutionary terms in transport conventions including CMR are illustrated by the cases 
concerning the status of a container, trailer or similar means used to group the cargo. The consequence of 
the container revolution resulted in the evolution of fact as the courts tend to accept the development in 
technology but also in evolution of law because of the Rotterdam Rules which are the legal response to 
these developments. These technical terms have highly influenced the understanding of concepts embedded 
in transport conventions, among the others – “goods”, “loading” and “ship”.  
                                                            
17 G.G. Fitzmaurice, C.M.G., 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and 
Certain Other Points' [1951] 28(1) British Year Book on International Law 24-25. 
18 Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, United Nations (2006) note 7 para. 23. 
19 See also different taxonomies for evolutionary terms in: Panos Merkouris, (Inter)Temporal Considerations in the 
Interpretative Process of the VCLT: Do Treaties Endure, Perdure or Exdure? in Mónika Ambrus (eds), 45 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law ( 2014) 141- 143. 
20 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, (Oxford 2008) 243. 
21 Julian Arato, 'Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and 
Their Diverse Consequences' [2010] 9 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 450-455. 
22 Panos Merkouris, (Inter)Temporal Considerations in the Interpretative Process of the VCLT: Do Treaties Endure, 





In the prominent judgement from the 1 February 200823, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that a container 
may be considered a part of the ship if it is provided by the carrier. Remarkably, the court decided to refer 
to the status of a container as referred in the Rotterdam Rules24 despite the fact that the Hague Visby Rules 
were applicable and the Rotterdam Rules were – and still are – not in force. The court in the process of 
interpretation found out that neither the text of art. 3 paragraph 1 Hague Visby Rules nor its preamble give 
clear answer to the question whether the containers supplied by the carrier for the purpose of cargo 
transportation are to be considered part of the ship. Since the ordinary meaning of the convention – 
including its preamble – brought no results, the court took recourse to historical method of interpretation 
and referred to the travaux préparatoires of The Hague Visby Rules. Even though it is questionable whether 
the immediate recourse to supplementary means of interpretation was correct, these as well provided no 
answer to the problem. In view of this, the court took a position that in interpreting a provision of uniform 
private law the purpose and the scope of that provision have a decisive importance. In fact, the court turned 
to the teleological approach. It was further decided that the scope of the duty of care of the carrier under 
Art. 3 of the Hague Visby Rules includes also to the cargoworthiness, meaning that the ship has to protect 
the cargo against the dangers of the sea. This implies that the carrier must ensure that the containers 
provided by him are suitable to carry the load placed therein. The court did not finish its conclusions with 
the application of the purposive method as it subsequently supported its decision by the reference to the 
definition of a container contained in the art. 16 (1) Rotterdam Rules. De facto we can talk here about 
subsequent practice before the subsequent agreement is actually in force.25 It is fair to presume that the 
court considered that the parties by using the technological developments intended the concepts of ‘goods’ 
and ‘ship’ to have the evolutionary character.   
The technological developments inspires adjudication also under other transport conventions. Speaking of 
the CMR, containerization has influenced the dynamic meaning of the loading and stowing operations as 
far as the groupage service is concerned. Here again, the practise seems to recognize the status of a container 
or other means to group cargo similarly to the Rotterdam Rules. In principle, one who takes the initiative 
to load – or consolidate – and stow the groupage cargo in the containers is liable for the damage arising 
therefrom. For example, in the decision of Budesgerichtshof from 25.01 200726 the court stated that the 
carrier is liable for the groupage cargo if he performed the consolidation. This is consistent with the case 
Brussels 23.12.71 (1972) 7 ETL 86527 where it was held that even if the groupage is performed by the 
operator acting as an agent of the sender, the groupage is still within sender’s risk and with the decision of 
Rechtbank van Koophandel te Gent (3e kamer) from 1.12.1998 where the groupage prepared by the sender 
but modified by the carrier resulted in shifting the risk from sender’s to carrier’s side.28 
Relying on the evolutionary character of terms must be thus a matter of necessity and subject to coherent 
approach in the field where the concepts can operate.29 The concept based on evolutionary terms should 
still work within the framework prescribed by the convention and cannot contradict it. Since parties’ 
intention leaves a room for the evolution of technical terms, the court should pay special attention to the 
context and convention’s purpose while interpreting the natural meaning of the terms which are subject to 
                                                            
23 The decision of the Dutch Hoge Raad from 1.02.2008, no C06/082HR. Available at: http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl 
24 Arts 1(24) in conjunction with 14 (c) and 17.5(a) Rotterdam Rules. 
25 On the difference between modification by the subsequent agreement and subsequent practice see: Georg Nolte, 
Treaties and Subsequent Practice, (Oxford 2013) 34-45. 
26 (I ZR 43/04) 
27 As reported in: Malcolm A Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (Informa 2009) 268. Clarke 
notices there also the possible dual role of a carrier if he performs loading according to the instructions of the sender. 
Even in these situations the sender bears the risk of loading.  
28 In its decision from 1.12.1998 as referred in [1999] 34(3) European Transport Law Journal the Rechtbank van 
Koophndel te Gent (3e kamer) decided that despite loading and stowing of a groupage by the consignor, the carrier is 
still liable for the damage of the goods when he unloads part of the groupage and does not protect the latter part.  





technological change. This should be the case unless there is a subsequent agreement or practice explicitly 
constituting the change.  
3. Functional application of autonomous vehicles 
The CMR will not be easily replaced which is a common feature of systems of regulation on a supranational 
level. Due to that different methods of how to deal with operation of autonomous vehicles has been 
developed. These methods indicates the way the term ‘vehicle’ can evolve. It is therefore important to break 
the functional application of autonomous vehicles down into different categories that can be identified in 
the current practice. Autonomous vehicles are considered vehicles as such, vehicles driven by A.I. agent 
and vehicles equipped with autonomous system.    
The first category is the vehicle as such, where the vehicle and A.I. system are defined as one technical 
concept. This categorization triggers the relocation of liability with the developer of the vehicle. For 
example Volvo has announced this approach as a step to allow further progress in the development, in 
testing, and the use their autonomous vehicles30. When these vehicles are operating in autonomous mode, 
Volvo takes responsibility for any wrongdoing of the vehicle. The similar approach can be noticed in the 
European Parliament motion on the recommendations on Civil Law Rules on Robotics to the Commission 
on Legal Affairs.31 The premise of this motion is that A.I. systems and robotics can contribute to the 
economic and social welfare of the European Union, but that the risks and consequences are profound and 
regulation is required in order to address these and guard the values that are deemed important. European 
Parliament’s recommendations underline the necessity of application of strict liability as a rule in case of 
the damage caused by autonomous systems where the liability of the machine-learning process to the A.I. 
would be measured by the system’s learning capability. In other words, the longer it would take to equip 
the system with its autonomous skills, the greater the responsibility of the one in charge of equipping would 
be. The recommendations also highlight other solutions like obligatory insurance schemes or compensation 
fund, these in turn to protect producer, user or programmer who will bear high risk and responsibility of 
releasing systems on the market.32  
A second category is the distinction between the vehicle and the ‘driving agent’, in this case A.I. systems. 
This distinction separates the vehicle as a technical concept from the decision-making agent that is in control 
of the vehicle. The ‘driving agent’ finds its source in the Google Self-Driving Car Project. The Google Self-
Driving Project is one of the largest experiments with 58 self-driving vehicles at this moment33. These 
vehicles are allowed on the road in certain cities and states in the U.S., for which specific agreements have 
been made. Their fleet of vehicles are partly traditional vehicles that are equipped with self-driving systems, 
and partly new vehicles that are developed to drive autonomously without any driver controls. These last 
vehicles, introduced in 2014, encountered the problem that the legal definition of driver was inevitably 
human, even though humans cannot control this vehicle anymore. At the initiative of Google, the U.S. 
                                                            
30 More on the federal guidelines for autonomous driving according to Volvo:  
<https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-gb/media/pressreleases/167975/us-urged-to-establish-nationwide-
federal-guidelines-for-autonomous-driving> 
31 Draft report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, European Parliament 
Committee on Legal affairs. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN> 
32 Compare with: David C. Vladeck, 'Machines without principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence' [2014] 
89 (117) Washington Law Review 145-150; European Parliament Draft Report with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics from 31.05.2016 (2015/2103 (INL)) 10, 22. 





National Highway Safety Administration decided that the A.I. system that controls the vehicle is the legal 
driver of the vehicle34 
To further complicate matters, a third category can be recognized. Namely the A.I. system is considered 
here only an additional and assistive equipment of the vehicle. This equipment that is not inherently part of 
the vehicle can provide different levels of autonomy to the vehicle. Two examples are the Tesla Autopilot, 
which is an optional package on their vehicles that provides a limited level of autonomy to the vehicle35. A 
second example is the self-driving car kit from Comma.ai36, a kit that is being developed to install on a 
large set of vehicles to provide a limited level of autonomous driving in comparison to the Tesla Autopilot. 
The third category further complicates matters because the liability may only be determined on a case-by-
case basis because of the very different applications, technical abilities, and use cases.  
4. CMR & autonomous vehicle 
Autonomous vehicle is not a legal but technical concept. What at the present day seems to be identified 
with autonomously operating trucks is probably going to change in few years’ time, this especially in the 
light of discussed above categories of autonomous vehicles. It will matter as far as the interpretation of the 
CMR is concerned if new technologies can influence the meaning of the conventional terms. In the 
following section, the focus is on what the autonomous vehicle according to CMR can be.  
The scope rules of the CMR laid down in art. 1 underline as one of the requirements of the Convention’s 
applicability the carriage of goods in vehicles. It is further provided that a ‘vehicle’ means motor vehicles, 
articulated vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers as defined in the art. 4 of the Convention on Road Traffic 
dated 19 September 1949. Without going into details on the applicability of the Convention on Road Traffic 
in its form from 1949 and its amended version from 1968 through the reference in the CMR37, the core of 
the concept of vehicle presented there is the requirement of the presence of a person who drives a vehicle, 
(“driver”).38 Nevertheless, since the CMR refers only to exact definitions which do not include personal 
assistance of the driver or other type of navigation, autonomous road vehicles would be considered the 
vehicles falling under the art. 1.2 CMR. Meaning, they could be considered motor vehicles which are self-
propelled vehicles normally used for the transport of persons or goods upon a road, other than vehicles 
running on rails or connected to electric conductors. The problem left is the qualification of the A.I. systems 
which operates the vessel. 
How unmanned autonomous navigation will be integrated into the car is something of an open question. 
The ongoing projects present the solutions where the autonomous software is operating the vessel39, is the 
integral part of the vessel or even aftermarket technology which can be applied in every “standard” car. As 
a result, the A.I. system can be the inherent part of the vehicle but also the equipment provided for the 
purpose of carriage. Then, in case of the software failure the situation is at a difficult crossroad because 3 
liability regimes might be applicable. The carrier may be liable under 17.3 CMR in case software is 
qualified as a part of the vehicle. However, if this software is treated as a part for special equipment less 
strict duty from 17.4 in conjunction with 18.4 CMR will be applicable. Finally, if the software is neither 
                                                            
34 NHTSA decision on Google Self Driving Car Project. Available at: <http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--
%20compiled%20response%20to%2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--
%204%20Feb%2016%20final.htm> 
35 More information available at: <https://www.tesla.com/nl_NL/presskit/autopilot?redirect=no 
36 More information available at: https://commaai.blogspot.nl/> 
37 K.F. Haak, The liability of the carrier under the CMR, (Stichting Vervoeradres 1986) 48-49.  
38 Art. 4 in conjunction with art. 8 of the Convention on Road Traffic from 19 September 1949. 
39 Whereas now there is still a human 'controller', in the near future he will be also replaced by AI system. See e.g.: 
Sungwook Cho (et.al), 'Development of a Cooperative Heterogeneous Unmanned System for Delivery Services', 





the part of the vehicle nor the special equipment, the liability of the carrier will be decided on the ground 
of art. 17.1 CMR.40 
Obviously, the synthetic distinction concerning the software being a part of vehicle or not will lead to 
uncertainty in judgments. The consequences of these 3 regimes are different. In the light of broad 
interpretation of the “latent vehicle’s defect”41 and rather high threshold of art. 18.4 CMR, if we consider 
the system as falling under the scope of respectively art. 17.3 or 17.4, this would question the issue of 
imposing unreasonable conditions on the carrier. Basically, any failure of an A.I. system, which would be 
attributable as either the defect of vehicle or lack of proper maintenance (for example in case of not 
preventing cybercrime and hacking) will be the ground to hold the carrier liable. The general liability rule 
from art. 17.1 CMR and exoneration clauses established especially in arts 17.2 (circumstances that could 
not be avoided) and 17.5 (liability to the extent of contribution to the damage, loss or delay) might also not 
assure certainty. Since AI systems are constantly developing, the circumstances which cannot be avoided 
today, may be easily prevented tomorrow. Similar problems can happen with the assessment of contribution 
to damage, loss or delay. The point is how to judge a diligent carrier when the A.I. system is playing a trick 
on him.42 Does the fact of using the systems which are subject to constant development make him 
immediately negligent? 
For further consideration should be left whether for the future of autonomous vehicles and their autonomous 
standing new liability rules should be created. This is especially important in the light of new risks inherent 
to the autonomous vehicles and growing recognition of the autonomy of A.I. systems which are de facto 
capable of being in charge of some operations. As mentioned before, the US National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) for the purpose of Google which is testing autonomous vehicles has issued 
an interpretation where the computerized system has been considered the driver.43 Should the A.I. system 
be assigned the commonly known functions of agent or even a carrier, the evaluation of commonly known 
concepts is required as for example it might be impossible to judge what the negligence of the agent A.I. 
system is or subject to which regulation the liability should be established. Another example is Volvo which 
decided to accept full liability for the wrongful actions of its autonomous cars. Should there be a clause in 
the carriage contract shifting the responsibility for the vehicle or vehicle and its A.I. system from the carrier 
to the producer, it might be found as a clause derogating from the CMR provisions under art. 41 CMR.  
Undoubtedly, the presence of A.I. systems equals the occurrence of new risks. The assessment of these 
risks is getting very difficult or even impossible with the regulations at hand. The CMR as a legal model 
becomes in large parts also outdated. This in turn might produce something of a stalemate. In case of the 
CMR its aim to balance the powers between contacting parties and provide the uniformity of applicable 
law might not be any more possible even if the judges, deciding on the ground of the Convention, stretch 
its rules to the maximum. Subsequent problem, however, undoubtedly resulting from the preceding, is the 
moment when this 'stretching' must be stopped.   
5. CMR – future proof or time for a reform?  
Due to the fact that international conventions are not easily replaced, they should be found under certain 
circumstances as ‘living instruments’ and evolutionary terms facing technological development is certainly 
                                                            
40 Compare with: Malcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (Informa 2009) 245-247. 
41 Compare: Jan Theunis (ed.), International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), (LLP 1987) 85; Contrary: K.F. Haak, 
The liability of the carrier under the CMR, (Stichting Vervoeradres 1986) 152.  
42 See as an example the cases of flash crashes on the financial markets, where it is difficult or impossible to establish 
the cause of system's failure. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf 







one of these. It is especially important in the light of the fact that VCLT assures safety mechanisms for 
dynamic interpretations which will prevent judges becoming legislators. That is to say, the dynamic 
interpretation should be always imbedded in parties’ will and purpose of the convention. Secondly, the 
practical applications show the way the term can evolved. Nevertheless, this again should comply with the 
framework of interpretation.  
Speaking of autonomous vehicles in the CMR framework, the autonomy of the machines is a very 
challenging issue, especially due to the fact that they are considered to operate on the same level as humans 
without supervision. Whether this might be consistent with the CMR framework, even with its dynamic 
interpretation, is highly doubtful. The reason behind this doubt is that the autonomous vehicle stretches the 
concept of vehicle under the CMR until the point where the evolutionary character of the concepts can be 
questioned.44 The practice shows that the term ‘vehicle’ can acquire such a meaning which will prevent the 
purpose of the CMR. That is to say, according to the available CMR liability regimes, the autonomous 
vehicle with its A.I. system will in principle always depart from the purpose to limit the carrier’s liability. 
Furthermore, this liability in case of using autonomous vehicles - at least for now - may only be determined 
on a case-by-case basis because of the very different applications, technical abilities, and constant 
development of autonomous vehicles. In the light of this, the interpretation will never comply with the 
standard of predictability and acceptability.  
As a result, some options can be taken in consideration. When the introduction of self-driving vehicles 
stretches the concepts and framework of the CMR to its limits, the consequences of breaking the framework 
of the CMR convention should be considered before the breaking point is actually met. Only then will the 
CMR convention demonstrate to be future-proof. Thus, a structural dialog between legislators, judges, legal 
scholars and the transportation sector is required to monitor the concepts of CMR and anticipate 
technological developments that may influence the concepts of the CMR. These developments will be 
uncertain and may never be fully anticipated, but proactive monitoring will provide grip on the uncertainties 
that these technological developments bring to the CMR. Should the situation reach the moment when new 
technological developments cause derogation from the convention’s regime, the revision tools embedded 
in the conventions – in the context of this submission art. 49 CMR – must be finally taken into consideration.  
 
                                                            
44 Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, United Nations (2006) note 7 para. 23. 
